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ABSTRACT
Two different types of agency are discussed based on dynamically coherent and incoherent couplings with an
environment respectively. I propose that until a private syntax (syntactic autonomy) is discovered by dynamically
coherent agents,  there are no significant or interesting types of closure or autonomy. When syntactic autonomy is
established, then, because of a process of description-based selected self-organization, open-ended evolution is enabled.
At this stage, agents depend, in addition to dynamics, on localized, symbolic memory, thus adding a level of dynamical
incoherence to their interaction with the environment. Furthermore, it is the appearance of syntactic autonomy which
enables much more interesting types of closures amongst agents which share the same syntax. To investigate how we can
study the emergence of syntax from dynamical systems, experiments with cellular automata leading to emergent
computation to solve non-trivial tasks are discussed. RNA editing is also mentioned as a process that may have been used
to obtain a primordial biological code necessary open-ended evolution.
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1. CLOSURE AND AGENTS
To understand closure in evolutionary systems, we need to be able to distinguish between an evolving system
and its environment, which typically includes other such systems. Indeed, the notion of closure can only be
meaningful if we can discern some sort of autonomy of one system from an environment or alternatively, a loop,
2i Joslyn1 presents a discussion of the types of closures one can identify.
ii For a discussion of possible types of system/environment couplings, particularly, of evolving
couplings, please refer to 2.
iii Stable memory must of course be materially implemented, and thus it is always dynamic at
some level5. The stability or inertness of memory tokens must be seen as relative stability within the
timescale of the dynamic system-environment coupling. The inertness of memory tokens has been
discussed in detail elsewhere6, 7, 8. 
or cycle, established between  more than one systemi. For both of these cases, in the context of evolutionary
systems, we need first to understand the nature of distinguishable systems capable of evolving. In other words,
we need to agree on what is it that allows us to separate a system from an environment so that we can refer to
it as autonomous or place it in some kind of loop with other systems or the environmentii? This separability
implies some kind of agency, so let us start by discussing the notion of agent.
The term agent is used today to mean anything between a mere subroutine to a conscious entity. There are
“helper” agents for web retrieval and computer maintenance, robotic agents to venture into inhospitable
environments, agents in an economy, etc. Intuitively, for an object to be referred to as an agent it must possess
some degree of autonomy, that is, it must be in some sense distinguishable from its environment by some kind
of spatial, temporal, or functional boundary. It must possess some kind of identity to be identifiable in its
environment. To make the definition of agent useful, we often further require that agents must have some
autonomy of action, that they can engage in tasks in an environment without direct external control. This leads
us to an important definition of an agent from the XIII century, due to Thomas Aquinas3: an entity capable of
election, or choice. 
This is a very important definition indeed; for an entity to be referred to as an agent, it must be able to step out
of the dynamics of an environment, and make a decision about what action to take next – a decision that may
even go against the natural course of its environment. Since choice is a term loaded with many connotations
from theology, philosophy, cognitive  science, and so forth, I prefer to discuss instead the ability of some agents
to step out of the dynamics of its interaction with an environment and explore different behavior alternatives.
In physics we refer to such a process as dynamical incoherence4. In computer science, Von Neumann, based on
the work of Turing on universal computing devices, referred to these systems as memory-based systems. That
is, systems capable of engaging with their environments beyond concurrent state-determined interaction by using
memory to store descriptions and representations of their environments. Such agents are dynamically incoherent
in the sense that their next state or action is not solely dependent on the previous state, but also on some
(random-access) stable memory that keeps the same value until it is accessed and does not change with the
dynamics of the environment-agent interactioniii. In contrast, state-determined systems are dynamically coherent
(or coupled) to their environments because they function by reaction to present input and state using some
iterative mapping in a state space. 
Let us then refer to the view of agency as a dynamically incoherent system-environment engagement or coupling
as the strong sense of agency, and to the view of agency as some degree of identity and autonomy in dynamically
3coherent system-environment coupling as the weak sense of agency. The strong sense of agency is more precise
because of its explicit requirement for memory and ability to effectively explore and select alternatives. Indeed,
the weak sense of agency is much more subjective since the definition of autonomy, a boundary, or identity (in
a loop) are largely arbitrary in dynamically coherent couplings, as we shall discuss below. I further posit that
only the existence of symbolic memory tokens can establish clearly identifiable autonomies and closures, which
in turn lead to open-ended evolution.
2. DYNAMICALLY COHERENT SYSTEM-ENVIRONMENT COUPLINGS: SITUATED SEMIOSIS
2.1 Self-Organization
Self-organization is seen as the process by which systems of many components tend to reach a particular state,
a set of cycling states, or a small volume of their state space (attractor basins), with no external interference.
This attractor behavior is often recognized at a different level of observation as the spontaneous formation of
well organized structures, patterns, or behaviors, from random initial conditions (emergent behavior). The
systems used to study this behavior computationally are referred to as discrete dynamical systems or state-
determined systems, since their current state depends only on their previous state. They possess a large number
of components or variables, and thus high-dimensional state spaces. 
Computational self-organization is often used to model physical matter using such constructs as boolean
networks or cellular automata. The state-determined transition rules are interpreted as the laws of some physical
or chemical system2. It follows from the observed attractor behavior that there is a propensity for matter to self-
organize9. In this sense, matter is described by the laws of physics (which are modeled computationally) and the
emergent characteristics of self-organization. In the following, whenever the words matter and materiality are
used, they should be understood as reflecting this notion of self-organization both in physical and computational
environments.
2.2 Emergent Classification: Semantic Emergence
Self-organizing attractor basins can be used to refer to observables accessible to the self-organizing system in
its environment, and thus perform environmental classifications (e.g. classifying neural networks).These self-
organizing systems produce dynamic stabilities in interaction with their environments, which route observables
from this interaction into a small set of attractor basins which produce a corresponding small set of behaviors.
In this sense we say that the self-organizing system classifies its environment into such a  small subset of
behaviors. This process of obtaining classifications of an environment by a self-organizing system, has been
referred to generally as emergent classification6,7. Emergent because it is the result of the local, state-determined,
interaction of the basic components of the self-organizing system and its dynamic interaction with the
environment. In this sense, the dynamically coherent coupling of a self-organizing system with its environment
establishes a semantic dimension: attractor states leading to a small set of behaviors produced by the self-
organizing system are used to classify and cope with an environment. Thus, the attractor states refer to
environmental observables. A discussion of this emergent classification, also known as eigen-behavior, was
pursued in 6.
4iv The need of a serious study of selection processes has been outlined in 12, a more extensive
discussion is left for future work.
2.3 Pragmatics: Selected Self-Organization
To effectively deal with a changing environment, systems capable of relating internal stabilities to
environmental regularities, must be able to change their own dynamics in order to produce new basins of
attraction for new classifications and behaviors. In other words, the self-organizing system must be structurally
coupled to some external system which acts on the structure of the first inducing some form of explicit or
implicit selection of its dynamic classifications, this process has been referred to as selected self-organization
6,7, 8. Now, for selection to occur we must have some internal vehicle for classification — there must be different
alternatives. The range of attractor landscapes of self-organizing systems offers these alternatives. One way of
conceptualizing this is to think of the attractor landscape as a distributed memory bank 10, where each attractor
basin is seen as storing a given classification configuration. This ability of a self-organizing system to select
appropriate dynamic classification configurations to deal with a changing environment can be referred to as
dynamically coherent selected self-organization or dynamically coherent categorization (in the context of
cognitive science11). 
In the biological realm, such selection is implicitly defined by different rates of reproduction of individuals in
varying (genetic) populations, while in the cognitive realm we may have some form of explicit selection referred
to as learning through conversation11. A simple example in an applied domain, would be an external algorithm
for selecting the weights (structural perturbation) of a neural network in order to achieve some desired
classification, or evolutionary strategies which rely on internal random variation which is ultimately externally
selected.
Selected self-organization explicitly emphasizes a second dimension of the semiosis of self-organizing systems
dynamically coupled (in situation) with their environments. If self-organizing classification implies semantic
emergence, selection implies pragmatic environmental influence. In fact, these two dimensions of semiosis
cannot be separated; the meaning of the classifications of a self-organizing system does not make sense until
it is grounded in the feedback from the repercussions it triggers in its environment. The dynamically coherent
coupling, or situation, of a classifying, self-organizing agent in its environment is the source of meaning. Indeed,
selection does not act on memory tokens internal to a classifying system but on the repercussions those trigger
in an environment. Semantics of dynamically coherent (situated) agents  is pragmatic. In this sense, meaning
is not private to the agent but can only be understood in the context of the agent’s situation in an environment
with its specific selective pressures.
The ability of agent/environment couplings to select appropriate attractor states to cope with an environment
takes us closer to agent’s that can select behavior alternatives. Note, however, that selected self-organization
requires both self-organization and a selective process to be specifiediv. Not merely state-determined, rule-
following, self-organization which would amount to agents with no real alternatives. This notion of selected
self-organization leads us now to think of what kinds of selection processes are possible, and more importantly
for the present work, does this choice of alternative classifications/behaviors exist in or require some kind of
autonomy or closure?
5v For a detailed discussion of this model see6, 7, 8.
3. DYNAMICALLY INCOHERENT SYSTEM-ENVIRONMENT COUPLINGS: OPEN-ENDED
SEMIOSIS
3.1 Von Neumann and the Syntactic Advantage
Von Neumann’s model of self-replication13 is a systems-theoretic criteria for open-ended evolutionv. Based on
the notion of universal construction and description it provides a threshold of complexity after which systems
that observe it can for ever more increase in complexity (open-ended evolution). However, unlike the situated
semiosis of agents dynamically coherent with their environments described in 2, this model clearly does not rely
on a distributed but on a local kind of memory. Von Neumann’s descriptions entail a symbol system on which
construction commands are cast. These descriptions are not distributed over patterns of activation of the
components of a self-organizing system, but are instead localized on “inert” structures which can be used at any
time — a sort of random access memory. 
By “inert” structures, I mean components with many dynamically equivalent states which can be used to set up
an arbitrary semantic relation with the environment. For instance, in the genetic system (which Von Neumann’s
model conceptually describes), most any sequence of nucleotides is equally possible, and its informational value
(genetic information) is largely independent of the particular dynamic behavior of the DNA/RNA sequence.
Genetic information is not expressed by the dynamics of nucleotide sequences (RNA or DNA molecules), but
is instead mediated through an arbitrary coding relation that translates nucleotide sequences into amino-acid
sequences whose dynamic characteristics ultimately express genetic information in an environment. It is
precisely the dynamic irrelevance of nucleotide sequences (“inertness”) that makes DNA/RNA ideal candidates
for localized carriers of genetic information (descriptions) given an arbitrary genetic code14, 15. DNA qua carrier
of genetic information in biological organisms is virtually dynamically incoherent with the
organism/environment coupling, since the information needed to construct a given protein (the description) can
be retrieved at any time as much as a book can be retrieved from a library16. Indeed, recent organisms carry many
of the same genes used by primordial organisms to produce the same proteins. In their role of information
carriers, the dynamical substrate of genes (the DNA molecule) is largely irrelevant.
Von Neumann showed that there is an advantage of symbolic, localized memory over purely dynamic, or
distributed, memory in self-replication because if we do not have symbolic descriptions directing self-
replication, then an organism must replicate through self-inspection of its parts. Clearly, as systems grow in
complexity, self-inspection becomes more and more difficult14. The existence of a language, a symbol system,
allows a much more sophisticated form of replication. Functional, dynamic structures do not need to replicate
themselves, they are simply constructed from non-functional (dynamically inert) descriptions and available
parts. For instance, for an enzyme to replicate itself without descriptions, it would need to have the intrinsic
property of self-replication “by default” as a template, or it would have to be able to assemble itself from a pool
of existing parts. But for this, it would have to “unfold” so that its internal portions could be reconstituted by
self-inspection for the copy to be produced14. With the genetic code, however, none of these complicated
gimmicks are necessary: functional molecules can be simply folded from inert messages. This method is by far
6vi The issue of what is meant by descriptions was raised by Alvaro Moreno at this meeting. While
this issue is not fundamental to the argument pursued in this article, allowing this section to be bypassed
without loss, it is nonetheless a very interesting topic. Thanks to Alvaro for pointing this out.
more general since any functional molecule can be produced from a description, not merely those that either
happen to be able to self-reproduce as a template, or those that can unfold and fold at will to be reproduced by
self-inspection from available parts.
The genetic symbol system, with its utilization of inert structures, opens up a whole new universe of behaviors
and functionality which is not available to purely dynamic self-replication (template or self-inspection). In this
sense, it can evolve behaviors and functions in an open-ended fashion: all describable (by the genetic code)
proteins can be produced. It also introduces the third level of a semiosis of classifying systems in situation with
their environments: syntax – as defined by a construction code. This type of system-environment selective
coupling can be referred to as description-based selected self-organization8. Arguments for the idea of language
as a provider of such an enabling syntax for cognitive systems which can be used to recombine distributed
memory systems in an open-ended manner have been pursued elsewhere17, 7. In particular, a computer system
for active recommendation of information in networked databases has been developed and proposed as a model
of cognitive categorization11. In the cognitive realm, this type of system/environment coupling capable of open-
ended semiosis is referred to as linguistic-based selected self-organization. Clearly, the evolutionary processes
that result from this semiotic system-environment coupling at the biological and cognitive level are different,
yielding active and passive evolutionary trends18, 19, 20 which beg to be identified and modeled computationally12.
3.2 Descriptions and Material Codesvi
Von Neumann used the notion of description-based universal construction clearly in a computer science context,
where all construction must at some level be completely described or programmed. In his self-reproduction
scheme a description encodes a complete blueprint of automata to be constructed by the universal constructor
automaton. This need for a complete specification of the construction of self-reproducing automata is very far
from the actual biological, material, machinery of the genetic selected self-organization of living systems. So
in what sense do we use the term description when speaking of biological systems? Clearly, genes do not encode
the complete specification of proteins and the means to produce them. That is, genes do not encode information
such as how to fold a protein. All of this comes for free with the laws of matter21. A true universal constructor,
in a physical sense, would need to encode everything down to physical law. Henri Atlan22 has warned us about
this computational metaphor, and proposes that instead of thinking of genes as descriptions or programs, we
should think of them as data for the dynamic machinery of the cell. Let us explore this issue in more detail.
When Von Neumann’s universal constructor interprets a description to construct some automaton, a semiotic
code is utilized to map (translate) instructions into computational actions to be performed. When the copier
copies a description, only its syntactic aspects are replicated (transcription). Now, the language of this code
presupposes a set of computational primitives for which the instructions are said to “stand for”(the semantics).
In other words, descriptions depend on the set of computational primitives of the interpreting device (the
constructor). If such a set of primitives is complete in the Turing sense, then it establishes a computationally
universal process. 
7In contrast, in the material world, a construction code such as the genetic code presupposes a set of material
primitives that follow physical law. In this sense, material codes are not universal as they refer to some material
constituents which cannot be changed without altering the significance of the descriptions. We can see that a
self-reproducing material organism following Von Neumann’s scheme is an entanglement of symbolic controls
and material constraints which is closed on its semantics only through its repercussions in an environment (the
pragmatics). Howard Pattee calls such a principle of self-organization semantic closure14, 23. Perhaps a better
description would be to refer to it as semiotic closure since then the three semiotic dimensions of semantics,
pragmatics and syntax would be well accounted for.
A material code is defined by a small, finite, number of symbols (e.g. codons in DNA), which can encode a
finite number of primitive parts (e.g. aminoacids). There is a countable number of functional structures which
may be constructed with a given set of parts. This defines the representational power of a given material symbol
system. From coded messages, a potentially infinite number of products can be constructed. However, since the
products are dynamic and not symbolic structures, they will have different dynamic characteristics (for which
they are ultimately selected). Moreover, the messages encoded stand for some arrangement of parts (strings of
aminoacids) and not just the parts themselves. An arrangement of dynamic structures, however simple, tends
to form a complex dynamic compound which will self-organize according to physical laws.
A particular material symbol system is tied to specific construction building blocks. The richer the parts, the
smaller the required descriptions, but also the smaller the number of constructable products. Conrad24 refers to
this as a tradeoff between programmability and high evolutionary plasticity or efficient use of computational
resources. For instance, Von Neumann used simple building blocks such as “and” and “or” gates to build the
code of his self-reproducing automata, which in turn required a 29 state cellular automata lattice and very
complicated descriptions. Arbib25, 26 was able to simplify von Neumann’s model greatly by utilizing more
complicated logical building blocks, but losing some  generality. Likewise, the genetic system does not need
to describe all the chemical/dynamical characteristics of a “desired” protein (full programmability), it merely
needs to specify an aminoacid chain which will itself self-organize (fold) into a functional configuration with
some reactive properties. A given set of parts such as amino acids, provides intrinsic dynamic richness which
does not have to be specified by the symbol system on which construction commands are cast21 making
descriptions much smaller and establishing higher evolutionary plasticity. The cost of this plasticity or efficient
ability to specify proteins, is that the genetic code is not universal in that it cannot specify anything whatsoever,
but only those things that can be constructed from aminoacid chains. It establishes nonetheless a material symbol
system which can specify or describe any conceivable amino-acid chain. As Von Neumann showed, self-
reproduction which utilizes such a symbol system, plus mutation, leads to open-ended evolution.
Interestingly, we can easily model computationally the ability to compress descriptions in symbol systems based
on richer dynamic parts. That is, we can define computational codes which do not completely specify a product,
but rather encode building blocks that can then self-organize computationally. This is often done in Artificial
Life with indirectly encoded genetic algorithms: genetic descriptions which encode cellular automata, boolean
networks, L-Systems and the like that self-organize into solutions interpreted at some higher level of observation
of the simulation27, 28. In fact, I specifically showed how this kind of indirect encoding can solve optimization
problems with smaller descriptions, as observed in material systems7.
8Therefore, we should think of descriptions not as complete, universal specification, but rather as material
specification , that is:  encoded initial conditions or constraints for material (e,g. aminoacid chains) or
computational (e.g. cellular automata) self-organizing systems. This is how Pattee sees descriptions in his
semantic closure principle: the symbolic controls that impose material constraints14. This seems better than
Atlan’s view of genetic information as data for the machinery of the cell. By trying to escape the overused
computer metaphor, Atlan actually adds to the confusion of the computationalist metaphor by conceiving the
machinery of the cell as a computer which needs data. The Pattee/Von Neumann view of genetic information
as descriptions of initial conditions is more reasonable because the symbolic and material aspects of evolving
systems are clearly delineated and not blurred: symbolic descriptions encode material constraints or initial
conditions. This view of description-based selected self-organization treats descriptions not as programs but
encoded self-organizing processes.
3.3 Why do we need syntax?
It can always be argued that the random access memory the genetic system establishes, is nothing but
complicated dynamics, and the syntactic dimension is just the result of our subjective observation. But similar
arguments can always be pursued to discourage any kind of multi-level theory or complementarity. Indeed, the
notion of self-organization also requires a multi-level argument. The dynamic/self-organizing level results from
the necessity of complementary modes of description to describe our (ultimately subjective) observation of
patterns and regularities at another level other that state-transition rules. So why stop there?  The genetic
dimension has established a new hierarchical level in evolutionary systems which allows a greater level of
control of the purely self-organizing bio-chemical dynamics. Failing to recognize this symbolic level, would
prevent the distinction between self-organizing systems such as autocatalytic networks, from living systems
whose replication by genetic memory is much more efficient than replication by template or self-inspection. 
In evolutionary systems this is at the core of the feud between those who claim that natural selection is the sole
explanation for evolution and those who stress that other aspects of evolutionary systems, such as developmental
constraints, also play an important role. It is no wonder then that the first group stresses the symbolic
description, the gene, as the sole driving force of evolution29, 30, while the second group likes to think of the
propensities of matter or historical contingencies as being of at least equal importance in evolution31,32,9. In
pragmatic terms, however, most evolutionary theorists, acknowledge that all these factors play important roles31.
Since all of these aspects of evolutionary systems co-exist, we need inclusive theories and models that
incorporate both symbolic and dynamic characteristics14, 7, 33. We may conceive evolving agents which are purely
dynamic; they observe the dynamically coherent selected self-organization discussed in 2 that is capable of
semantic emergence in a selective environment (pragmatics). But the introduction of the syntactic level as
prescribed by Von Neumann defines a richer (open-ended) evolution available only to agents capable of a full
situated semiosis (semantics, pragmatics, and syntax) with their environments. In the next section we discuss
how the former can be seen as autonomous agents in only a much weaker sense than the latter.
4. SYNTACTIC AUTONOMY
Semiotics leads us to think of symbols not simply as  abstract memory tokens, but as material tools34 for a
situated semiosis of classifying systems with their environments, which requires the definition of components
9vii In this paper I discuss autonomy and closure in terms of self-organization as a state-determined
or dynamical process, and in terms of the semiosis of agents in an environment. Often autonomy and
closure are also discussed in terms of thermodynamics. I understand that this may be a very important
explanatory tool, but which, I believe, is nonetheless not yet theoretically well-developed enough to
describe such out-of-equilibrium phenomena as what is necessary to explain living systems.
that interact and self-organize with the laws of their environment2. How such a semiotic code can arise from a
purely dynamic self-organizing system is still very much a mystery both for biological and cognitive systems,
though computational experiments to investigate the emergence of symbolic activity35 and even codes36 have
been proposed. Before presenting some recent results in this area, we need to discuss what are the implications
of the notion of semiotic (description or linguistic) selected self-organization for autonomous agents or agents
participating in some closed loop with other agents or the environment.
A classifying self-organizing system is often described as autonomous if all processes that establish and sustain
its dynamics are internally produced and re-produced over and over again37. These are the systems capable of
self-reference38.  But the autonomy or closure of these systems is really an abstraction that demands at some
point an arbitrary identification of a boundary of some kind between system and environment. Indeed, the
emergent, self-organizing,  behavior of situated agents (dynamically coherent with their environments) is as
much a result of the production rules of the agent as of the laws of the environment39, 40, 2. Furthermore, how
autonomous are the systems that follow some form of situated semiosis with their environments? Given the
arguments for selected self-organization, we know that it is the environment which ultimately selects the
dynamic configurations of classifying systems. The dynamically coherent coupling between system and
environment on which situated semiosis is based requires this pragmatic openness, other-reference38, 41, or
external scaffolding40. 
Semantics is therefore defined only by the situated, pragmatic, conjugation of system and environment, which
indicates that situated agents are neither dynamically nor semantically autonomous. Indeed, a semantic loop or
closure23 can only be established between the agent and the entire environment, since, as we discussed above,
situated semantics is pragmatic. If, for situated (dynamically coherent) agents, semantic closure can only be
observed if we create a loop between an agent its entire environment, then we may be better off abandoning the
notion of closure, or indeed semiosis, altogether and adopting a purely dynamical view of the world, in which
agents are just another indistinguishable dynamical component of a network of many components. In this case,
it might be much more accurate to use a dynamical systems theory explanatory scheme39 vii. But is there any kind
of more profound semiotic autonomy or closure in evolutionary systems that may require another level of
explanation and modeling beyond dynamical systems theory?
Biological systems have developed a system of structural perturbation of their self-organization clearly based
on a (genetic) code that essentially implements Von Neumann’s scheme of inert symbolic descriptions. It is
undeniable that this syntactic code is completely specified within organisms since its reading and constructing
machinery is found within each cell: an autonomous code defined by specific syntactic rules. Even though
environmental conditions clearly affect what is decoded in different circumstances42, 7, the code itself remains
fixed. The ability to generate such a powerful system of assembly of self-organizing encoded components for
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the construction of evolving classifying systems, is the one defining characteristic of all known life forms, which
somehow produced this code or autonomous syntax for a more efficient situated semiosis with the environment.
Until we include syntax in the semiosis of situated agents in an environment as discussed in3, we cannot really
speak of any kind of autonomy and the only closure we can identify entails the whole environment, which is
clearly not interesting a type of closure. The introduction of a syntactic code allows the kind of recombination
of dynamic descriptions used for construction of organisms which leads to open-ended evolution when included
in a self-replication scheme as specified by Von Neumann. It furthermore allows the communication of these
descriptions to systems which possess the same semiotic code. This way, more interesting types of closure
between agents are enabled. Now, semiotic loops or closures can be established between an agent and other
agents that share the same syntax without including the entire environment. Biological organisms all share the
same genetic code, thus establishing a full semiotic closure with semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic dimensions
which does not include non-biological agents. This is why we can use bacteria to produce human proteins or
any other kind of transgenetic technology. We can find even tighter semiotic closures amongst organisms of the
same species, which can communicate and recombine their genetic descriptions more effectively.
To recap, purely situated agents which exist in dynamical coherence with their environments, possess a week
sense of agency in, or autonomy from, their environments. Their dynamics are intertwined with the environment
and their semantics emerges from repercussions of their situated action in the environment. In this sense, there
is also no physical or semiotic autonomy. Furthermore, a semiotic loop or closure can only be identified if we
include the entire environment. It is only when we include the third dimension of semiosis, syntax, in the sense
described in section 3 that we can identify more interesting types of autonomy and closure among groups of
agents. The agents which possess this syntactic autonomy, rely on the existence of symbolic memory and
possess therefore an element of dynamical incoherence with their environment (the strong sense of agency) in
addition to the dynamic situation of their predecessors. The question now is how can symbols arise from
dynamical substrates and how can we approach the study of this process.
5. SYNTACTIC AUTONOMY IN COMPUTATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
5.1 Emergent Particle Computation
A very interesting problem that genetic algorithms (GA’s) have been used successfully in, is the evolution of
Cellular Automata (CA) rules for the solution of non-trivial tasks. Certain CA rules are capable of solving global
tasks assigned to their lattices, even though their transition rules are local (each cell computes its next value
given the current value of the cells in its immediate neighborhood). One such tasks is usually referred to as the
density task: given a randomly initialized lattice configuration (IC), the CA should converge to a global state
where all its cells are turned “ON” if there is a majority of “ON” cells in the IC, and to an all “OFF” state
otherwise. This rule is not trivial because the local rules of the component cells do not have access to the entire
lattice, but can only act on the state of their immediate neighborhood.  
Crutchfield and Mitchell35 used a GA to evolve the CA rules for such a task. The GA found a number of fairly
interesting rules, but a few of the runs evolved very interesting rules (with high fitness) which create an intricate
system of lattice communication. Basically, groups of adjacent cells propagate certain patterns across the lattice,
which as they interact with other such patterns “decide” on the appropriate solutions for the lattice as a whole.
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An intricate system of signaling patterns and its communication syntax has been identified, and can be said to
establish the emergence of embedded-particle computation in evolved CA’s35, 43. The emergent signals (or
embedded particles) refer to the borders of the different patterns that develop in the space-time diagrams. If the
areas inside these patterns are removed, their boundaries can be identified as a system of signals with a definite
syntax, or emergent logic grammar. This syntax is based on a small number of signals, ", $, *, (, 0, and :,
and a small number or rules such as: " + * 6 :, meaning that when signals " and * collide, the : signal results.
Please refer to the references above for more details.
These experiments are very interesting because from the interaction of self-organization (CA’s)  and selection
(GA) a very simple semantics emerges from the selective pragmatics of the GA: the CA rule either classifies
its initial lattice configurations correctly or incorrectly. Now, most CA rules evolved with this set up show very
simple space-time patterns: they try to solve the problem by block-expansion, that is, when large neighborhoods
of either “ON” or “OFF” states exist in the initial configuration, they are expanded. These block expansion rules
solved the task in typical dynamical fashion: by taking into account only local information.
Instead, the system of particle computation uses signals that are capable of integrating distant global information
to solve the task. These CA rules rely on a system or grammar of signals (a code) used to communicate across
the lattice and compute the answer to the task: a sign system that grants great selective advantage to the rules
capable of developing it. The particle computation system truly introduces a qualitatively different way of
solving the task: through the emergence of syntax, which allows certain rules to gain access to global lattice
information. Obviously, such a system does not possess the rich self-reproduction scheme of Von Neumann,
but it does show how the emergence of syntax grants simple dynamical systems the ability to move from trivial
to non-trivial classification of their interaction with an environment.
5.2 Increasing Arbitrariness: Logical Tasks
The signals of the emergent particle computation system in CA’s, even though being a small set of discrete
entities, are not full-fledged symbols in the senses described in section 1, because they do not possess the degree
of arbitrariness required of pure symbols: the syntax may be specific to the task solved.  However, very similar
signals and grammars can be evolved to solve different tasks, e.g. the synchronization task43. In other words,
this class of CA’s can develop similar signals to solve different problems.
To increase the arbitrariness of the emergent syntax of these rules, we can evolve rules that are good at solving
several tasks. I have conducted some experiments to evolve CA rules with radius 3 which can solve both the
density task and some related logical tasks. To implement logical tasks, we divide the CA lattice in two halves
(the center cell is not used). The first half is interpreted as the first bit, and the second half as the second bit. A
bit is “ON” if there is a majority of “ON” cells in its half, and “OFF”otherwise. Notice that since the boundary
conditions of the lattice are periodic, this lattice has two boundaries between the two halves or bits. The cells
on the neighborhood of these boundaries compute their values from cells in both halves, which in most cases
makes the computation on these boundaries unreliable. However, since we are looking for global
communication  across the lattice, we expect the local errors at the boundaries not to be too relevant for the
global computation, especially as lattices grow in size.
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We can now define such logical tasks as the AND and the OR task, according to the values of the bits. For the
AND (OR) task, for all values of the bits the lattice should converge to an all “OFF” (“ON”) state, except when
both bits are “ON” (“OFF”). These tasks are both related to the density task because when the density of both
halves is below (over) 0.5, both bits are “OFF” (“ON”), leading to a desired final lattice with all cells “OFF”
(“ON”). They differ for the cases when the two halves of the lattice have opposing densities. In other words,
these tasks should perform the density task in each half, and then integrate the results, with the AND (OR) task
biased by “OFF” (“ON”) information on either half. 
Several rules were evolved with a GA whose initial population was composed of some of the best rules evolved
so far for the density task, and whose fitness function was derived from presenting each rule with 100 different
initial lattices, 50 to be analyzed by the density task, and the other 50 by either the AND or the OR task. The
50 rules to be presented to the density task have their density of “ON’s” uniformly distributed over the unit
interval (just as the experiments described in 3.1). The 50 rules presented to the AND (OR) task are biased to
a uniform distribution of lattices leading to at least one bit “OFF” (“ON”) 50% of the time, and both bits “ON”
(“OFF”) the other 50%. If we were to use an unbiased generation of lattices, only 25% of the time would the
case of both bits “ON” (“OFF”) be generated, making rules that always tend to “OFF” (“ON”) always too
favorable.
From these experiments, several rules were evolved that can solve both the density task and one of the logical
tasks very well. Also, unlike the density task, the performance of the logical tasks often increases with the lattice
size, probably because the boundary errors described earlier loose relevance in some cases as the density
situation in each bit has a larger lattice to be resolved. I would expect this behavior to be a consequence of the
Rule
Pdens PAND POR 
149 599 999 149 599 999 149 599 999
0504058705000F77037755837BFFB77F
[Crutchfield/Mitchell]] .773 .725 .707 .713 .73 .738 .664 .578 .548
000F730F001FFF0F000FFF0F001FFF1F [Das Rule] .823 .777 .763 .68 .684 .68 .733 .686 .675
050055050500550555FF55FF55FF55FF [Koza rule] .823 .766 .73 .679 .674 .644 .727 .671 .642
0760437B0700413507600F7F47F577FF [Jouille Rule] .833 .788 .771 .656 .642 .62 .747 .736 .743
0057005D005F005D085FFF7F405FFF5F .78 .705 .668 .77 .783 .784 .634 .501 .453
005F1053405F045F005FFD5F005DFF5F .635 .510 .503 .84 .76 .754 .441 .261 .254
005F005F005F005F005FFF6F005FFF5F .805 .755 .737 .624 .605 .581 .756 .738 .743
0504070705002573077755B37BFFF77F .745 .65 .61 .501 .421 .371 .784 .793 .785
Table I: Unbiased performance (random generation of 100000 IC’s) for the density, AND, and OR tasks, for CA lattices of
dimension 149, 599, and 999. The first 4 rules are some of the rules fed to the initial population of the GA described above;
the last 4 rules are some of the best rules evolved with this GA.
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viii From recent experiments which will soon be published. 
velocity of the particles evolved, but such an analysis will be left for future research. A more detailed analysis
of the particle computation systems of these recently evolved rules is forthcoming. Table I presents some of the
rules evolved in hexadecimal format (each hexadecimal digit should be converted to 4 binary digits to obtain
the CA rule; the left bit is the least significant one).
The relevance of these experiments is that they show that there is a family of particle computation rules which
with a few mutations can develop a system of particle computation that can solve two different, yet related,
tasks. Indeed, the rules were evolved from a population of rules that solve very well the density task. The
particle computation systems provides the self-organizing CA the ability to adapt to a new environment that
requires the solution of two similar tasks. In other words, it has the ability to evolve into a system that with the
same syntax can effectively solve a related class of problems and not just one single task. In this case the class
of tasks includes the density task and some logical task that is coherent with the density task. The ability to solve
more than one task increases the arbitrariness of the emergent syntax of these rules, as the same syntactic rules
of particle computation are used to compute different tasks. This increased arbitrariness shows that the particle-
computation system can develop a larger scope of computations with particles that more and more be regarded
as arbitrary symbols. 
In fact, recent results from experiments conducted by Wim Hordijkviii, show that equivalent sets of particles and
grammars have been discovered to solve different tasks. This increases the scope of tasks that the same CA rule
can solve, therefore granting higher arbitrariness and survival ability of their respective CA’s when embedded
in more demanding environments requiring different tasks to be solved. The CA’s with particle computation
ability, cope better with changing environments requiring different tasks, than purely dynamic CA strategies.
6. RNA EDITING: THE ORIGIN OF SYNTACTIC AUTONOMY IN BIOLOGY?
The discovery of messenger RNA (mRNA) molecules containing information not coded in DNA, first persuaded
researchers in molecular biology that some mechanism in the cell might be responsible for post-transcriptional
alteration of genetic information; this mechanism was called 'RNA Editing'44. “It was coined to illustrate that
the alterations of the RNA sequence (i) occur in the protein-coding region and (ii) are most likely the result of
a post-transcriptional event”45, page 16. The term is used to identify any mechanism which will produce mRNA
molecules with information not specifically encoded in DNA. Initially, the term referred to the insertion or
deletion of particular bases (e.g. uridine), or some sort of base conversion (e.g. adenosine ÷ guanisine). Today,
more RNA editing mechanisms, have been observed, for a good review please refer to46. 
The idea that life may have originated from pure RNA world has been around for a while47, 48. In this scenario
the first life forms relied on RNA molecules as both symbolic carriers of genetic information, and functional,
catalytic molecules. The neutralist hypothesis for the function of RNA editing assumes such a RNA world origin
of life. It posits that RNA editing could offer a process by which the dual role of RNA molecules as information
carriers and catalysts could more easily co-exist. The key problem for the RNA world origin of life hypothesis
is precisely the separation between these two functions of RNA. On the one hand RNA molecules should be
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stable (non-reactive) to carry information, and on the other hand they should be reactive to perform their
catalytic function. RNA editing, could be seen as means to fragment genetic information into several non-
reactive molecules, that are later, through RNA editing processes, integrated into reactive molecules46. This way,
the understanding of this process of mediation between the role of RNA molecules as information carriers and
catalytic molecules based on RNA editing, can also offer many clues to the problem of origin of a semiotic code
from s dynamic (catalytic) substrate. 
Given many random distributions of the reactivity of a RNA sequence space, we could study how easily can
reactive sequences be constructed from RNA edition of non-reactive molecules. A study of this process is
forthcoming.
7. CONCLUSIONS
I discussed the notions of closure and autonomy of evolutionary agents in terms of self-organization as a state-
determined or dynamical process, and in terms of the semiosis of such agents in an environment. Based on the
work of Pattee and Von  Neumann, I propose that until a private syntax (syntactic autonomy) is discovered by
self-organizing agents, these agents exist in dynamically coherence or situation with their environments that
include other agents. At this stage there are no significant or interesting types of closure or autonomy. When
syntactic autonomy is enabled, then, because of description-based selected self-organization, open-ended
evolution is established. At this stage, agents depend on localized, symbolic memory, thus adding a level of
dynamical incoherence to their interaction with the environment. Furthermore, it is the appearance of syntactic
autonomy which enables much more interesting types of closures amongst agents which share the same syntax.
Particle computation in cellular automata experiments were also discussed as an example of how we can study
computationally the emergence of syntax from self-organizing dynamics. RNA editing is also mentioned as a
process that may have been used to obtain the kind of syntactic autonomy necessary for open-ended evolution,
that is, a description-construction code.
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